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Does Public Opinion Affect Political Speech?
Anselm Hager Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Hanno Hilbig Harvard University
Abstract: Does public opinion affect political speech? Of particular interest is whether public opinion affects (i) what topics
politicians address and (ii) what positions they endorse. We present evidence from Germany where the government was
recently forced to declassify its public opinion research, allowing us to link the content of the research to subsequent speeches.
Our causal identification strategy exploits the exogenous timing of the research’s dissemination to cabinet members within
a window of a few days. We find that exposure to public opinion research leads politicians to markedly change their speech.
First, we show that linguistic similarity between political speech and public opinion research increases significantly after
reports are passed on to the cabinet, suggesting that politicians change the topics they address. Second, we demonstrate that
exposure to public opinion research alters politicians’ substantive positions in the direction of majority opinion.
Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results,
procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SLXRVJ.
Does public opinion affect political speech? Thisimportant question of political science hasreceived little empirical scrutiny. The handful
of published studies have yielded conflicting findings.
One influential study by Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) finds
little evidence that public opinion meaningfully affected
the rhetoric of President Bill Clinton. By contrast,
Rottinghaus (2008) uses White House archival data
and demonstrates that public opinion places significant
constraints on presidential framing. Evidence that
reliably establishes a causal connection between public
opinion and political speech, however, is scarce.
What explains the lack of evidence? First, elected offi-
cials typically mask their means of gauging public opinion
and their exposure thereto. Second, the dissemination of
public opinion to politicians must be exogenous if one
wants to establish a causal relationship. Third, when an-
alyzing political speech, researchers face nontrivial mea-
surement challenges. Any analysis into the interplay of
public opinion and political speech must differentiate
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whether it explores i) the topics politicians address or ii)
the substantive positions they endorse.
The present article circumvents these challenges by
using an unusual source of information: classified govern-
mental public opinion research. In 2013, a politician of the
German Green Party sued the German government in or-
der to gain access to its classified public opinion research.
The German Federal Press Office (Bundespresseamt,
henceforth BPA) subsequently and reluctantly granted
the politician access to all public opinion research con-
ducted between 2009 and 2013. Overall, the politician,
together with a team of journalists, hand-copied more
than 10,000 pages of classified public opinion research.
These research reports offer a unique lens into
elected officials’ exposure to public opinion. They are ad-
dressed directly to Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel,
and are disseminated to all cabinet members. The pur-
pose of the reports is to give political elites a succinct
overview of public opinion. The research is conducted
by Germany’s major public opinion research firms. Most
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reports include up to 60 pages of qualitative and quanti-
tative insights. It is here that cabinet members find a rich
repertoire to attune, or not, their speech to public opinion.
How does exposure to public opinion affect politi-
cians’ speech? We hypothesize that exposure to pub-
lic opinion can lead to two different reactions. First,
it may lead politicians to change what topics they
address (agenda setting; John and Jennings 2010;
Mortensen et al. 2011). The logic is that the reports
make specific topics cognitively salient and also sig-
nal what topics are of relevance to the electorate.
Second, exposure to public opinion may lead politi-
cians to adjust their substantive positions to the me-
dian voter (Eggers and Spirling 2014). After all, the re-
search reports clearly communicate what the population
thinks.
To explore these hypotheses, we take advantage of the
fact that the public opinion reports indicate the date on
which the BPA sent them to the cabinet. And, there are
good reasons to believe that the precise timing is exoge-
nous (within a window of a few days). The reports un-
dergo a tedious tendering process, and we show that the
dissemination dates do not cluster around salient events
such as elections or parliamentary sessions. The dissemi-
nation timing is also orthogonal to the media salience of
a given report’s topic as well as to citizen satisfaction with
the government.
Based on the plausibly exogenous timing of the re-
ports’ dissemination to cabinet members, our empirical
strategy is to compare politicians’ speech to the public
opinion reports right before and right after a report was is-
sued. We measure political speech using all published gov-
ernment speech documents from 2005 to 2016 (>20,000).
To capture agenda setting, we measure linguistic (cosine)
similarity between the reports and political speech. To ex-
plore substantive responsiveness, we measure agreement
between the reports and political speech by hand-coding
a random subset of 2,000 speech–report pairs.
Using a regression discontinuity design, we yield two
key pieces of evidence. First, we find that linguistic simi-
larity between politicians’ speech and the public opinion
reports increases by 0.014 points (S.E. = 0.007) on a 0-1
scale after reports are passed on to the cabinet. We inter-
pret this finding to mean that exposure to public opinion
changes what topics politicians address. Second, we find
that substantive agreement increases by 0.2 points (S.E. =
0.07) on a 7-point scale. The finding thus implies that ex-
posure to public opinion also leads politicians to become
more responsive to the public’s preferences.
Can our empirical strategy tell agenda setting
and substantive responsiveness apart? One concern
regarding the main findings is that the measures of
agenda setting and responsiveness overlap. Specifically,
one may object that if politicians adjust their substantive
positions, this also manifests itself in increased linguistic
similarity. Although this measurement concern does
not compromise the causal inferences we draw, it does
highlight the difficulty of adjudicating between agenda
setting and substantive repositioning. To parse the two
strategies apart, we present two pieces of evidence. First,
we show that both measures are not correlated. Second,
we demonstrate that effect heterogeneity by topic salience
is different across the two measures. When politicians
address salient topics, we only see increases in similarity,
while substantive agreement does not change. By con-
trast, when politicians address nonsalient topics, we see
increased substantive agreement, but no changes in cosine
similarity. The finding helps clarify the conditions under
which politicians change their agendas and when they
decide to take different substantive positions: When top-
ics are salient, substantive realignment may be too risky,
which makes changing agendas more attractive. The re-
verse holds for nonsalient topics. Here, changing agendas
carries little weight, but substantive repositioning may
win over voters without risking politicians’ reputation.
Our results contribute to three related debates in
political science. First, we add to a growing literature an-
alyzing political speech (Binzer Hobolt and Klemmensen
2008). Scholars have long argued that politicians’ speech,
particularly that of U.S. presidents, influences public
opinion (Cohen 1999). We complement this literature
by showcasing that causality also runs in the opposite
direction. Though others have explored this relationship
(Wood and Lee 2009; Rottinghaus 2006), we are the first
to provide causal estimates.
Second, the evidence adds to a debate about whether
executive leaders follow centrist or partisan considera-
tions. By highlighting that German politicians adjust their
speech to public opinion (i.e., the median voter), we sup-
port a centrist reading of executive political behavior (e.g.,
Canes-Wrone 2006). By the same token, the evidence re-
jects a partisan reading, whereby executives cater to their
own political clientele (Wood 2009).
Last, we contribute to a growing literature that ap-
plies text-analytical methods to political science (Slapin
and Proksch 2008; Lowe et al. 2011; Grimmer and Stew-
art 2013; Roberts et al. 2014; Lucas et al. 2015). Recent
empirical studies have assessed, inter alia, bureaucratic
transcripts (Egesdal, Gill, and Rotemberg n.d.) and diplo-
matic cables (Gill and Spirling 2015). Analyses regarding
internal government reports, however, are few and de-
scriptive in nature. We bring large-N causal evidence to
this literature, showing that public opinion affects politi-
cians’ speech agenda and substantive positions.
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Theoretical Background
Against the backdrop of a large literature underlining the
rhetorical craftsmanship of elected officials (see Chong
and Druckman 2007), little is known about the ways in
which public opinion affects political speech. Vaughn and
Villalobos, for instance, lament that social scientists have
“ignored the determinants of what the president actually
says” (2006, 681). Shapiro and Jacobs second that “we
are only now beginning to learn about the relationship
between presidents and the polling and public opinion
analysis that has gone on in presidential administrations
since the 1960s” (2001, 151). What is more, the few em-
pirical accounts that assess whether elected officials adjust
their speech to public opinion are inconclusive.
On the one hand, scholars have presented evidence
that questions whether public opinion has any influence
on political speech. In one historical study, Hall (2002)
uses interviews and archival data to assess whether Pres-
ident George W. Bush used public opinion research to
forge his rhetoric. The author finds that Bush had a dis-
tinct distaste for polls, labeling them “phony and arti-
ficial” (Hall 2002, 531). Similarly, Jacobs and Shapiro
(2000) analyze President Clinton’s failed health care re-
form campaign and Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with
America” and find little evidence for rhetorical pander-
ing. One rare large-N study is provided by Wood and Lee
(2009) who develop a measure of presidential liberalism
from 1945 to 2005 and find presidents rather unrespon-
sive to mass political preferences.
On the other hand, a different set of scholars has
presented evidence demonstrating that public opinion
does affect political speech. They point out the skillful
employment of public opinion research in several U.S.
administrations. Rottinghaus (2008), for instance, uses
White House archival data, including internal polling re-
ports, and finds that public opinion placed constraints
on presidential framing of foreign policy. Relatedly, Geer
(1996) finds that the professionalization of White House
public opinion polling led presidents to adjust their
speech to public preferences. In one systematic empir-
ical study, Rottinghaus (2006) matches presidential state-
ments spanning nine administrations to public opinion
polling and demonstrates robust congruence.
A key limitation of the existing empirical studies is
that they merely correlate politicians’ speech with public
opinion. As such, they fall short of providing causal es-
timates and simply reiterate the well-established finding
that public opinion correlates with political speech. The
prime reason for this shortcoming is that it is difficult to
make a convincing case that elected officials’ exposure to
public opinion is exogenous. In addition, we lack empir-
ical evidence from outside the United States or even the
Oval Office.
At a more fundamental level, it is also unclear
how public opinion affects politicians’ speech. Provid-
ing elected officials with new information about public
opinion may lead to two distinct reactions. First, obtain-
ing up-to-date public opinion may inspire politicians to
put a given topic on their agenda. Second, information
on public opinion may lead politicians to substantively
align their speech with the median voter. We discuss both
pathways in turn.
Agenda Setting
At a basic level, exposure to public opinion may lead
elected officials to change their agenda. We define such
agenda setting as “the priority given to an issue” (Chong
and Druckman 2007, 112). Put more simply, agenda set-
ting captures whether an elected official talks about a
specific issue or not. Why may exposure to public opin-
ion affect elected officials’ speech agenda? Two reasons
are noteworthy.
First, the provision of public opinion may signal to
politicians that a given topic is of relevance to citizens.
Public opinion research—including the reports commis-
sioned by the BPA—tends to focus on important issues.
Public opinion is also known to be less volatile for salient
issues (Weaver 1991). Thus, if a cabinet member is ex-
posed to public opinion, she may interpret this as evi-
dence that voters care about the topic, leading her to put
the topic on her agenda.
Second, the provision of public opinion on a given
topic makes the topic cognitively salient to the politician.
And, like ordinary citizens, politicians try to “minimize
the cognitive burdens for forming judgments by drawing
on those considerations that are most accessible” (Koch
1998, 211). Thus, if a cabinet member reads a report on
tax reform, she may draw on this very topic in her next
speech or newspaper interview because the report made
the topic cognitively salient.
H1 (Agenda Setting): Exposure to public opinion on
a given topic leads politicians to put the topic on
their agenda.
Responsiveness
Besides affecting politicians’ speech agenda, exposure to
public opinion may also lead politicians to change how
they substantively address a given topic. More specifi-
cally, exposure to public opinion may spark (rhetorical)
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responsiveness—a core tenet of representative democ-
racy. We define responsiveness as “politicians follow[ing]
preferences as they change” (Wlezien 2004, 2). Why may
exposure to public opinion lead elected officials to en-
dorse substantive positions that accord with the me-
dian voter?
First, public opinion research parses out what
the majority thinks. Following Downs’s median voter
theorem, one would therefore expect that politicians
craft their speech so as to cater to the majority (Wood
and Lee 2009). While the Downsian assumptions do not
hold in Germany’s multiparty system, the main party
studied here, Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, does
consider itself centrist.
Second and related, the provision of public opinion
research may prime elected officials to focus their atten-
tion toward the median voter. Traditional party politics
leads politicians to think about their core clientele. Public
opinion research, by contrast, analyzes the entire pop-
ulation. Besides providing quantitative information on
majority opinion, this may thus lead politicians to adopt
a more comprehensive view of representation.
H2 (Responsiveness): Exposure to public opinion on
a given topic leads politicians to endorse majority
opinion on the topic.
Data
Public Opinion Research Reports
We use an unusual source of evidence to study whether
public opinion affects political speech. In September
2012, Malte Spitz, a member of the German Green Party,
filed an official inquiry with the BPA. He demanded
access to two research reports the BPA had commissioned
on behalf of the German government. The office denied
the request. Malte Spitz then sued the government
under the German Freedom of Information Act. He
was subsequently granted access to the reports but was
only allowed to make hand copies (Becker and Horning
2014).
The party member, together with two Der Spiegel
journalists, scanned 125 reports, which comprise over
10,000 pages. An exemplary report page is provided in
Figure 1, showcasing their highly detailed nature. The
research reports are all addressed directly to Chancellor
Merkel (“Dear Mrs. Chancellor”), followed by a two-page
summary written and signed by the head of the BPA. The
purpose of these summaries is to condense the findings
so as to give the chancellor and other cabinet members
FIGURE 1 Exemplary Public Opinion Report
Note: The figure displays page 1 of an exemplary research re-
port entitled “Population’s View on Tax Burden and Taxation”
(Steuerbelastung und Steuersystem aus Sicht der Bevölkerung).
The English translation is as follows: “For weeks, the coali-
tion partners and the public have been debating controversially
over the implemented and planned tax reliefs. In light of the
evolution of public finances, concerns have been raised as to
whether the austerity plans set out in the coalition agreements
can be achieved. This debate has left a mark on the popula-
tion as well. While in 2008 two-thirds of the entire population
were convinced that it would be possible to reduce the burden
of taxes and levies, today only 50 percent still hold this view.
In the Eastern states, the proportion of the population, which
expects considerable relief margins, has even declined from
74 to 52 percent.”
a succinct overview of public opinion. Most reports in-
clude up to 60 pages of qualitative and quantitative in-
sights. It is here that cabinet members and speechwrit-
ers find a rich repertoire to attune speeches to public
opinion.
The reports were commissioned by the BPA to lead-
ing German public opinion firms before being passed
on to the German cabinet. They span the entire leg-
islative term from 2009 to 2013. Importantly, the BPA
is an independent German bureaucracy. Contracts with
survey firms undergo a tedious tendering process (more
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below). In the period of study, the BPA commissioned
an average of 150 surveys per year. In so doing, the
BPA spent an average of two million euros per year
on its public opinion research (Becker and Hornig
2014). Within the BPA and during the period of study,
public opinion research was overseen by the head of
Unit 204 (“public opinion research and evaluation”),
Ute Molitor, and the presentation of the findings to the
cabinet was overseen by the head of the BPA, Steffen
Seibert. Importantly, the Merkel government—unlike the
chancellors Kohl and Schröder—specifically decided to
commission reports from all major public opinion firms
in order to receive a more objective overview of public
opinion. That said, Merkel and the cabinet do not directly
communicate with the research firms (a detailed discus-
sion of exogeneity is provided later; Becker and Hornig
2014). The reports thus represent a novel lens through
which one can assess whether exposure to public opinion
affects political speech.
To validate that the public opinion research reports
constitute accurate measures of public opinion, we gained
access to Germany’s most prominent and longest-running
opinion poll: the Politbarometer. The Politbarometer is
commissioned by Germany’s public television network
(ZDF) and was started in 1977. It consists of regular
(about 1.5 per month) surveys that serve to “poll the
opinions and attitudes of eligible Germans with regard
to current events and issues.” During the second Merkel
term, the ZDF commissioned 76 surveys with a total of
132,321 respondents. Based on these data, we make two
points in Appendix 9 in the supporting information (SI).
First, we show that 75% of the BPA research reports tackle
topics that voters, at the time of the write-up, consider
to be pressing issues. Second, we show that the relative
frequency of the topics covered in the Politbarometer is
highly comparable to the relative frequency of the topics
addressed in the government research reports.
To convert the public opinion reports into text data,
we followed standard operating procedures in the text
analysis literature. Using the R package tm, we first re-
moved numbers, punctuation, and white spaces from the
reports. We then stemmed all reports by removing stop
words, prefixes, and suffixes. On average, there were 1,683
words per report after stemming.
The descriptive statistics of the opinion reports are
provided in the left column of Table 1. We asked two inde-
pendent coders to assign all reports to political topics—a
straightforward task given that most reports already in-
clude topic headlines. The coders were asked to categorize
reports according to the 15 topics used by the German
government (Topic (original); more below). To stream-
line the analysis, we collapsed the 15 topics into seven
categories (Topic (aggregated)) that map more intuitively
onto German public opinion (details on the aggregation
rule are provided in SI Appendix 1).
Table 1 also reports the year and month of the re-
ports’ dissemination to cabinet members. Both variables
are fairly uniformly distributed. Finally, the table re-
ports which of the seven leading German public opinion
firms commissioned the report (Opinion firm). There are
three key players—Allensbach, Dimap, and Emnid—who
wrote 72% of all reports.
Political Speech
We measure political speech using all speech documents
published by the German government from 2005 to
2016—with Merkel in power during the entire period.
These documents include speeches, press releases, and
articles written by cabinet members. We scraped the doc-
uments from the website of the German government
(www.bundesregierung.de). The resulting data set cov-
ers all published speech documents by cabinet members.
We applied the same transformation to the text data, that
is, removing superfluous characters and stemming.
The descriptive statistics of the speech data are given
in the right column of Table 1. Again, we classify the topic
of the speech (Topic (original)). In particular, the German
government assigned 47% of all documents tags accord-
ing to the content of the speech. As before, we collapsed
these 15 topics into seven categories. These include for-
eign policy (28%), culture (19%), economic policy (15%),
social policy (13%), environmental policy (9%), and inte-
rior and education (both 8%). The rest of the documents
are published without an explicit topic assignment. To
avoid discarding valuable information, we use a machine
learning approach to automatically classify the untagged
documents. Using a support vector machine that takes
the tf-idf document-term matrix of the speech document
corpus as the input, we achieve an out-of-sample pre-
diction accuracy of 89% (for details, see SI Appendix 2).
Table 1 also reports the month and year of the publica-
tion. As can be seen, publications increased notably in
2011. The month of the publication, on the other hand,
is fairly homogeneous. Finally, Table 1 also indicates the
speech documents’ type, separating articles (59%/46%),
press releases (36%/27%), and speeches (5%/27%).
Empirical Strategy
Does public opinion affect political speech? If so, does
public opinion merely alter politicians’ speech agenda or
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics
Opinion Reports
Government Speech
(Manually Classified)
Government Speech
(Machine Classified)
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
Total 125 100 9,831 100 11,973 100
Topic (original)
Labor/Welfare 32 20 509 5.177 — —
Foreign policy 23 14.375 2,168 22.053 — —
Education/Research 3 1.875 770 7.832 — —
Agriculture 2 1.25 386 3.926 — —
Families 11 6.875 437 4.445 — —
Finances 25 15.625 458 4.659 — —
Health 4 2.5 345 3.509 — —
Interior 5 3.125 555 5.645 — —
Justice 3 1.875 212 2.156 — —
Culture 6 3.75 1860 18.92 — —
Environmental
policy
7 4.375 537 5.462 — —
Infrastructure 0 0.0 220 2.238 — —
Defense 9 5.625 273 2.777 — —
Economic
policy/Energy
30 18.75 785 7.985 — —
Economic
development
0 0.0 316 3.214 — —
Topic (aggregated)
Culture 6 3.75 1,860 18.92 863 7.208
Economic policy 55 34.375 1,463 14.881 1,684 14.065
Education 3 1.875 770 7.832 631 5.27
Environmental
policy
9 5.625 923 9.389 860 7.183
Foreign policy 32 20.0 2757 28.044 5406 45.152
Interior 8 5.0 767 7.802 1367 11.417
Social policy 47 29.375 1,291 13.132 1,162 9.705
Month
January 14 11.2 740 7.527 983 8.21
February 6 4.8 774 7.873 904 7.55
March 11 8.8 925 9.409 838 6.999
April 10 8.0 797 8.107 1,027 8.578
May 9 7.2 791 8.046 1,129 9.43
June 10 8.0 949 9.653 1,213 10.131
July 14 11.2 832 8.463 831 6.941
August 9 7.2 830 8.443 636 5.312
September 12 9.6 907 9.226 1,082 9.037
October 7 5.6 794 8.076 1,063 8.878
November 9 7.2 884 8.992 1,319 11.016
December 14 11.2 608 6.185 948 7.918
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 Continued
Opinion Reports
Government Speech
(Manually Classified)
Government Speech
(Machine Classified)
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
Total 125 100 9,831 100 11,973 100
Year
2005 0 0.0 8 0.081 0 0
2007 0 0.0 15 0.153 0 0
2008 0 0.0 58 0.59 0 0
2009 22 17.6 38 0.387 828 6.916
2010 29 23.2 221 2.248 2,358 19.694
2011 26 20.8 947 9.633 1,573 13.138
2012 25 20.0 1,535 15.614 742 6.197
2013 23 18.4 1627 16.55 722 6.03
2014 0 0 1,898 19.306 900 7.517
2015 0 0 2,017 20.517 1,017 8.494
2016 0 0 1,467 14.922 1,576 13.163
2017 0 0 0 0 2,257 18.851
Opinion firm
Allensbach 34 27.2 — — — —
Dimap 26 20.8 — — — —
Emnid 30 24.0 — — — —
FG 12 9.6 — — — —
GMS 3 2.4 — — — —
Polis 8 6.4 — — — —
TNS 12 9.6 — — — —
Medium
Article — — 5,785 58.844 5,492 45.87
Press release — — 3510 35.703 3,219 26.885
Speech — — 536 5.452 3,262 27.245
Note: “Absolute” refers to absolute frequencies of categories. The label “%” refers to relative frequency in percent. For “Opinion firm,”
“Year,” and “Month,” the total number of observations is equal to the total number of opinion reports (i.e., N = 125). Each opinion report
can have up to three topics. We display the summary statistics for the government speech documents separately for documents that were
categorized by the government and for documents that were automatically classified (see SI Appendix 2). We only predict aggregated issue
categories for untagged documents.
does it also affect the substantive positions they endorse?
To address these questions, we use two distinct measure-
ment strategies, which we introduce in turn. Thereafter,
we discuss our estimation strategy.
Measurement
Agenda Setting. To assess whether the public opinion
reports change what topics politicians address, we mea-
sure whether reports and politicians’ speech become more
linguistically similar after a report has been issued. For-
mally, this means creating a distance measure Similarityi, j
for all public opinion reports i and all speech docu-
ments j . This gives NReport × NSpeech = 125 × (9, 831 +
11, 973) = 2,725,500 observations. Our preferred mea-
sure of distance is cosine similarity—a simple and com-
mon measure of dissimilarity (e.g., Egesdal, Gill, and
Rotemberg n.d.). It ranges from 0 (documents are en-
tirely dissimilar) to 1 (documents are exactly the same).
Responsiveness. To assess whether the public opinion
reports affect politicians’ substantive positions, we mea-
sure substantive agreement between reports and politi-
cians’ speech. Our strategy, here, relies on human coding.
First, we drew a random sample of 2,000 speech–report
pairs (from the set of speech–report pairs that are on the
same topic and were released within 120 days of each
other; more below). Second, we asked trained research
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assistants (who were blinded to the treatment status)
to assign each of the pairs a score measuring substan-
tive agreement. The score ranged from –3 (the politician
strongly disagrees with public opinion displayed in the
report) to 3 (the politician strongly agrees with public
opinion). If politicians’ speech bears no relation to public
opinion, the research assistants assigned a score of 0 (more
details are provided in SI Appendix 4). Importantly, Fig-
ure 5 shows that the hand-coded responsiveness measure
is unrelated to cosine similarity. This builds trust that
both measures tap distinct reactions (more below).
Estimation Strategy
In order to test whether exposure to public opinion af-
fects political speech, we exploit the plausibly exogenous
timing of the reports’ dissemination to cabinet members.
Specifically, we construct a regression discontinuity (RD)
design that compares politicians’ speech to the public
opinion reports right before and after a report is dissem-
inated. The empirical strategy falls into a broader class
of studies that analyze attitudes just before and after ex-
posure to new information (e.g., Franco, Grimmer, and
Lim 2017).1 We discuss exogeneity and the discontinuity
specification in turn.
Exogeneity of Report Dissemination Timing. What de-
termines when reports are sent to the German chan-
cellery? As we outline in the following, there are nine
reasons to believe that the precise timing—within a num-
ber of days—of the reports’ dissemination to the cabinet
is exogenous.
First, German law requires that contracts above 500
euros (as is the case for reports of this scope) undergo
an official tendering process. Potential contracts must
be widely advertised, and at least three competitive bids
should be received. Since all seven major German public
opinion firms are regularly contracted, competition is
high. The length of the tendering process is thus tough
to predict, making it difficult to strategically time the
dissemination of findings to the cabinet.
Second, the commissioned reports comprise detailed
academic research. They include large representative sur-
veys and detailed focus group discussions. This adds an
additional variance to the timing. To assess the influence
of data collection effort on the timing of report dissemina-
tion in detail, SI Table A2 shows results from a regression
1Franco, Grimmer, and Lim (2017) study the effect of presiden-
tial appeals in the United States on public approval, constituents’
policy preferences, constituents’ perceived issue salience, and social
media activity.
of the number of days of data collection on the time it
took the BPA to disseminate a report after data collection
had already concluded. The table shows that the length of
data collection alone explains about 44% of variation in
the timing of report dissemination.
A third, related check regarding a possibly strate-
gic timing of the dissemination of the reports to cabinet
members concerns the timing of the survey evidence con-
tained in the reports and the date of the dissemination.
In SI Figure A6, we plot the number of days between data
collection and dissemination to the chancellor’s office.
The majority of reports are passed on to the chancellor a
few days after the last data were collected. This is further
evidence that BPA bureaucrats do not strategically time
the report dissemination.
Fourth, to quantitatively test for a possible influence
of cabinet members on the dissemination timing of the
reports, we examine whether reports on more salient top-
ics tend to be disseminated earlier than reports on more
peripheral topics. Perhaps cabinet members try to accel-
erate the release of reports that cover salient topics. We
measure topic salience based on newspaper mentions of a
given topic (for details, see SI Appendix 3). Reassuringly,
SI Table A2 shows that there is no relationship between
issue salience and dissemination timing.
Fifth, if the German chancellery does influence the
timing of the report dissemination, one would expect
them to do so ahead of important elections. To test this
hypothesis, we assess whether reports are more likely to be
issued right before state elections. SI Figure A.4 shows that
this is not the case. If anything, we observe that reports
are more likely to be issued after elections. The reason
might be that research firms are particularly busy ahead
of elections and therefore delay the release of the opinion
reports to the BPA.
Sixth, in a similar vein the German chancellery could
also try to accelerate the dissemination of reports before
parliamentary sessions so as to improve their parliamen-
tary speeches. One would therefore expect to see a greater
number of reports just prior to days when the German
parliament is in session. However, as SI Figure A.5 demon-
strates, reports are not more likely to be released in the
days preceding parliamentary sessions.
Seventh, if the dissemination date of reports is
strategically chosen, this might show up in a nonuniform
distribution of release dates across week days or months
of the year. Some days and months (notably, Fridays as
well as the months of July and August) tend to be less busy
in the German political system. However, Table 1 demon-
strates a highly regular timing across the year. This further
underlines the reading that the BPA tries to provide
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL SPEECH 9
German political elites with a regular, objective view
about public opinion.
Eight, we can assess whether the covariates of the
speech documents are similar right before and after opin-
ion research reports are issued. In SI Figure A.14, we
show that opinion report releases induce no meaningful
changes across a number of control variables, including a
given speech’s topic, length and medium.
Ninth, if the government strategically times the dis-
semination of the reports, it may do so during times when
voters are dissatisfied with the government. Yet, in SI
Figure A.13, we show that reports are not more likely to
appear when voters express greater dissatisfaction with
the government—as measured in the Politbarometer.
Regression Discontinuity Design. Having made the case
that the precise dissemination timing of the public opin-
ion reports to the cabinet is likely exogenous (within a
few days), we leverage this fact by adopting a regression
discontinuity design. Conceptually speaking, we restrict
the analysis to a short period before and after the dis-
semination of reports to cabinet members. The assump-
tion is that political speech that lies around the time of
the dissemination has isomorphic potential outcomes. By
comparing speech before and after the report dissemina-
tion, we can estimate the local average treatment effect
(balance tests are presented in SI Figure A.14).
Our main empirical specification is as follows:
Yi, j =  + Exposurei, j + 1 Xi, j
+ 2 Xi, j ∗ Exposurei, j +  ′ Zi, j + εi, j . (1)
Here, Yi, j is speech document i’s cosine similarity or
substantive agreement, respectively, with report j . The
running variable Xi, j is the time in days between the
release of the opinion report and the speech document,
which is positive if the speech document is released after
the report. Zi, j is a vector of control variables listed in SI
Table A6, and εi, j is the error term. We cluster standard
errors both by speech document and by opinion report.
Regression discontinuity designs require researchers
to choose a bandwidth within which assignment to treat-
ment is plausibly exogenous. Here, we rely on the band-
width selection method proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo,
and Titiunik (2014). To obtain the optimal bandwidth,
we use a subsample of all report–speech pairs that are
released at most 120 days apart and share the same topic.
The resulting optimal bandwidth is 22 days.2 Given that
2We choose 120 days, rather than the maximum of 3,227 days,
because the abovementioned algorithms otherwise choose band-
widths that are too large (400 days) to make credible inferences. We
FIGURE 2 Histogram of the Running Variable
Note: The figure plots a histogram of the running variable, that
is, the number of days between speech document release and
opinion report release (window of ±60 days).
bandwidth calculations are not without criticism, we con-
duct sensitivity tests below.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we estimate
the main equation using a local linear regression with
the aforementioned optimal bandwidth of 22 days. More
specifically, we fit local linear regressions using weights
from a triangular kernel to estimate the treatment effect.
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) show that the triangular ker-
nel is optimal at the boundary.
A crucial assumption of RD designs is that the units of
observation have no control over the assignment variable.
In our case, this would be violated if politicians are able to
time the release of a speech conditional on the publication
date of an opinion report. To bolster this assumption,
we follow McCrary (2008) who suggests that researchers
estimate whether there is a discontinuity in the number
of observations around the threshold. If the density of the
assignment variable is not continuous, this may indicate
that politicians adjust the timing of speeches to account
for the release of opinion reports.
To test the “no jump”-assumption, Figure 2 presents
a histogram of the running variable; that is, we plot the
days between the speech document and the opinion re-
port release for a window of 60 days around the release
date. The figure shows that the number of observations
before and after the cutoff is highly similar. There is thus
no evidence of sorting. To formally test this assumption,
we use a local polynomial density estimator proposed by
Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2019) and obtain an insignif-
icant p-value of .67.
also confirm the main finding when using all available data—both
in a simple OLS as well as when using a multilevel model (see SI
Table A4).
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Results
Agenda Setting
We begin by assessing whether exposure to the public
opinion reports changes what topics politicians address.
To do so, we assess whether linguistic similarity between
public opinion reports and political speech increases after
the dissemination of the reports. Table 2 demonstrates
that the dissemination leads to a significant increase in
linguistic similarity. Model 1 shows that the dissemina-
tion date increases cosine similarity between the reports
and politicians’ speeches by 0.014 (S.E. = 0.007) on a
scale ranging from 0 to 1. In Model 2, we include all
covariates provided in Table 1. The coefficient remains
virtually unchanged. This builds trust that our setup is
not compromised by unobserved confounding.
How large are the estimated effect sizes? As Table 2
reports, the effect is akin to a change of 0.14 standard
deviations. In SI Appendix 7, we report the same mod-
els using Jaccard similarity—an alternative measure of
linguistic similarity, which captures whether elites incor-
porate new words from the opinion reports into their
speeches. As SI Table A3 shows, the overlap between po-
litical speech and the research reports increases by be-
tween 1 and 1.5 percentage points after a report is issued.
Overall, we therefore interpret this as evidence that the
public opinion reports, indeed, affect political speech in
a substantively meaningful way.
Does the increase in cosine similarity capture agenda
setting? While caution is warranted, four reasons under-
gird this interpretation. First, the analysis focuses exclu-
sively on substantively meaningful words (stop words are
excluded). This ensures that the increase in linguistic sim-
ilarity is of substantive relevance. Second, to demonstrate
this more rigorously, in SI Appendix 6 we show that the
increase in similarity is driven by substantively mean-
ingful words (following a method proposed by Egesdal,
Gill, and Rotemberg (n.d.)). For instance, we show that
speeches on social policy more frequently rely on the word
social and refrain from using the word law as a result of
the dissemination. Third, we do not observe outright pla-
giarism. Indeed, as SI Appendix 5 shows, politicians are
careful not to quote verbatim from the reports. The re-
ports are thus not used as a mere rhetorical “stockpile.”
Fourth, the effect sizes are substantively meaningful. If
politicians merely used the reports to change their word-
ing, one would arguably not expect such noticeable in-
creases in similarity were it not for a change in the topics
they address.
That said, we must reiterate that the analysis matches
speeches and reports that address the same broad polit-
TABLE 2 Effects on Cosine Similarity
Cosine Similarity
(1) (2)
Exposure 0.0137∗∗ 0.0128∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0057)
Covariates No Yes
Observations 5,684 5,684
Mean of DV 0.1263
SD of DV 0.0976
Effect size in SD 0.1413 0.1319
Note: The table reports results from a local linear regression around
the release of the opinion reports (optimal bandwidth of 22 days;
Equation 1). The outcome is the cosine similarity between reports
and speeches. The sample is limited to pairs where both speech
document and opinion report address the same topic. In Model 2,
all covariates reported in Table 1 are included. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by speech document and by opinion re-
port.
∗p<.1; ∗∗p<.05; ∗∗∗p<.01.
ical topics. We do so because a window of a few days is
too small to realistically affect cabinet members’ broader
speech agenda (we confirm this in Table 3, which we
discuss below). As much was relayed to us in qualita-
tive interviews. The chancellor’s schedule is set months
in advance. A speech scheduled to be delivered in par-
liament on, say, economic policy cannot be changed to a
speech on culture—at least not at such short notice. The
public opinion reports can thus only plausibly affect the
intensive margin of politicians’ speech agendas, not the
extensive margin. Agenda setting thus seemingly takes a
more nuanced form: Politicians adjust their speeches but
within reason. This means, for instance, that a scheduled
speech on economic policy, after being exposed to public
opinion, changes its focus from growth to taxation. Alter-
natively, a speech on foreign policy may switch its focus
from aid to migration.
Robustness
Before exploring whether exposure to public opinion also
affects politicians’ substantive positions, we present five
robustness tests.
Bandwidth Sensitivity. In a first step, we let the RD
bandwidth vary. Figure 3 provides clear evidence that the
dissemination of reports leads to an increase in linguistic
similarity no matter which bandwidth is chosen. Even
the smallest computationally feasible bandwidth (4 days)
shows statistically significant effects. Again, effect sizes
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FIGURE 3 Effects on Cosine Similarity
(Bandwidth Sensitivity)
Note: The figure plots coefficients and standard errors of RD
regression of the cosine similarity outcome on time distance
(Equation 1). The x-axis indicates the bandwidth used for the
RD estimation. The y-axis plots the estimated effect size and the
corresponding standard errors, clustered by speech and report.
The vertical dashed line represents the optimal bandwidth (22
days).
are similar when including covariates (right-hand figure).
The figure also shows that the effect slowly fades out as
we increase the bandwidth. This likely demonstrates that
the effect of the reports is relatively short-lived, which one
would expect given the fast-paced nature of politics.
Randomization Inference. In a second step, we imple-
ment a version of Fisher’s exact test by rerandomiz-
ing the “treatment” (i.e., the dissemination date of the
public opinion report). To do so, we first generate a list of
possible report release dates. Thereafter, we sample new
dates from this list with replacement for each report and
calculate updated values for the time distance between the
speech documents and the reports. We then re-run the
benchmark RD model with the updated time distance, in-
cluding all covariates, and store the corresponding LATE
estimate. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times using the
optimal bandwidth of 22 days. In Figure 4, we plot the
distributions of the test statistic using the rerandomiza-
tion procedure. For the optimal bandwidth, we find that
only 1.4% of all iterations see a treatment effect that is
greater in absolute magnitude than what we see in the
actual data (i.e., P (| R D | > ̂ R D) = 0.014).
Placebo 1: Nonmatching Topics. In a third step, we
construct a placebo test that relies on the intuition
that one should not observe treatment effects when the
public opinion reports and the speech document ad-
dress different topics. Given our RD design with a win-
dow of a few days, such an extensive margin effect on
speech agendas would be implausible. As we argued,
cabinet members’ speeches are planned months in ad-
vance. Thus, if one were to observe treatment effects, this
would likely imply that unobserved factors such as gen-
eral shifts in speech—not exposure to the public opin-
ion reports—are responsible for the observed changes.
To construct such a test, we use the fact that we know
a given opinion report’s as well as a given speech docu-
ment’s topic. We then reestimate the RD model, matching
opinion reports and speech documents that do not ad-
dress the same broad topic. For example, this means
matching a research report on education to a speech
on foreign policy. The results from the placebo test are
provided in Table 3. As can be seen, the estimated co-
efficient is virtually zero. Similarity between politicians’
speech and public opinion reports does not increase after
the dissemination of reports when the two documents
address different topics.
Alternative Speech Measure. In a fourth step, we assess
whether exposure to public opinion also affects an alter-
native measure for political speech: speeches delivered in
the German parliament. Specifically, we use data provided
by Rauh (2015), which cover all speeches given by mem-
bers of the German government from 2009 to 2013. We
focus on parliamentarians who are part of the executive
and were thus plausibly exposed to the reports (for details,
see SI Appendix 8). We use these data to reestimate our
benchmark regression. As Table 4 shows, we see a similar
treatment effect for this alternative speech outcome. In-
FIGURE 4 Randomization Inference (Cosine
Similarity)
Note: The figure plots the distribution of the LATE from the
benchmark RD model when rerandomizing report release dates
1,000 times. The dashed vertical line indicates ̂ R D = 0. The solid
vertical line indicates the observed LATE using the original data
(see Table 2). The corresponding p-value is .014.
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TABLE 3 Effects on Cosine Similarity for
Unmatched Topics (Placebo)
Cosine Similarity
(1) (2)
Exposure 0.0003 0.0015
(0.0031) (0.0027)
Covariates No Yes
Observations 27,233 27,000
Mean of DV 0.0991
SD of DV 0.0839
Effect size in SD 0.0036 0.0179
Note: The specification follows Table 2; the sample is limited to
pairs where speech document and opinion report do not address
the same topic.
terestingly, the estimate is twice as large as the benchmark
regression estimate (Table 2). This may be due to the fact
that parliamentary speeches receive significant attention
in the media, which makes it particularly worthwhile for
elected officials to adjust their speech agenda.
Placebo 2: Opposition Members. In a final step, we use
the parliamentary speech data to construct an additional
placebo test. Specifically, we assess whether the dissem-
ination of opinion reports affects speeches given by op-
position party members. To create a valid counterfactual,
we focus on members of parliament (MPs) who would
plausibly be part of the cabinet—and thus be exposed to
the reports—were their party in power (see SI Appendix
8 for details). Crucially, since opposition party members
are not exposed to the classified reports, we do not expect
their speech to change. If, however, there are unobserved
shocks, one would expect opposition party members to
change their speech like members of the executive. The
TABLE 4 Effects on Cosine Similarity for
Parliamentary Speeches
Cosine Similarity
(1) (2)
Exposure 0.0469∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0131)
Covariates No Yes
Observations 3,451 3,451
Mean of DV 0.0882
SD of DV 0.1017
Effect size in SD 0.4608 0.3492
Note: The specification follows Table 2; the sample are parliamen-
tary speeches.
TABLE 5 Effects on Cosine Similarity for
Opposition Speeches (Placebo 2)
Cosine Similarity
(1) (2)
Exposure 0.0076 0.0189
(0.0174) (0.0132)
Covariates No Yes
Observations 1,084 1,084
Mean of DV 0.119
SD of DV 0.1185
Effect size in SD 0.0643 0.1592
Note: The specification follows Table 4; the sample is limited to
pairs where speech document and opinion report do not address
the same topic.
results from the RD estimation are presented in Table 5.
As can be seen, there is no significant treatment effect.
Opposition party members do not change their rhetoric
markedly after reports are issued.
Responsiveness
We have provided evidence that exposure to public opin-
ion leads politicians to change their speeches such that
they become more linguistically similar with public opin-
ion. But does this finding merely capture a change in the
topics elites adress? Or do politicians also adjust their sub-
stantive positions? To answer this question, we next turn
to the hand-coded set of 2,000 report–speech pairs.
Table 6 reports the benchmark RD model using
the substantive agreement outcome. Recall that trained
research assistants assigned each pair a score ranging from
–3 (the politician strongly disagrees with public opin-
ion displayed in the report) to 3 (the politician strongly
agrees with public opinion). The table shows that report
dissemination is associated with a significant increase in
substantive agreement. Model 1 demonstrates that expo-
sure to the reports increases substantive agreement be-
tween the reports and politicians’ speeches by 0.2 (S.E. =
0.08) on the 7-point scale. A precise example of substan-
tive repositioning is Merkel’s reaction to a government
report, which states: “Germans are particularly worried
about rising energy prices.” Six days later, a press release
by the government states: “She [Merkel] sympathizes with
citizens’ concerns about rising electricity prices.”
Again, the finding is robust to a variety of sensitivity
analyses. First, Model 2 in Table 6 shows that the estimate
is highly similar when including all available covariates.
Second, SI Figure A.15 demonstrates that the increase is
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL SPEECH 13
TABLE 6 Effects on Substantive Agreement
Substantive Agreement
(1) (2)
Exposure 0.1952∗∗ 0.2048∗∗∗
(0.0833) (0.0710)
Covariates No Yes
Observations 214 214
Mean of DV 0.0814
SD of DV 0.3591
Effect size in SD 0.5436 0.5703
Note: The table reports results from a local linear regression (Equa-
tion 1) around the release of the opinion reports (optimal band-
width of 17 days). The outcome is substantive agreement between
reports and speeches. The sample is restricted to pairs where both
speech document and opinion report address the same topic. In
Model 2, all covariates reported in Table 1 are included. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by speech document and by
opinion report.
∗p<.1; ∗∗p<.05; ∗∗∗p<.01.
detectable for a wide range of RD bandwidths. Third, SI
Table A5 shows that the finding is not detectable when
pairing speeches and reports that do not share the same
topic.3 Taken together, the evidence implies that exposure
to public opinion also affects politicians’ substantive po-
sitions. The link from public opinion to political speech
thus seemingly operates through (at least) two channels:
agenda setting and substantive responsiveness.
Agenda Setting vs. Substantive
Repositioning
Can we tell agenda setting and substantive reposition-
ing apart? One concern regarding the analyses presented
thus far is that the measures of responsiveness and agenda
setting overlap. Specifically, one may object that if elites
adjust their substantive positions, this also manifest itself
in increased linguistic similarity. Although this measure-
ment concern does not compromise the causal inferences
we draw, it does highlight the difficulty of adjudicating
between agenda setting and substantive repositioning. To
parse the two strategies apart, we provide four pieces
of evidence.
3Note that in order to afford this test, we hand-coded an additional
random sample of 200 speech–report pairs that do not share the
same topic. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to repeat the
randomization inference robustness test. Doing so would require
that we code all 2,301,431 pairs in order to ensure sufficient power
around the cutoffs, which is not feasible.
First, if substantive realignment goes hand in hand
with increased cosine similarity (our measure for agenda
setting), one would expect the two measures to be highly
correlated. If, by contrast, the substantive agreement mea-
sure is orthogonal to cosine similarity, this builds trust
that the measures capture distinct dimensions of political
speech. Reassuringly, Figure 5 shows no noticeable corre-
lation between the two measures. Increases in substantive
agreement (x-axis) are not accompanied by noticeable
changes in cosine similarity (y-axis). Put differently, sub-
stantive repositioning does not go hand in hand with
agenda setting. By the same token, a shift in agendas (co-
sine similarity) does not imply that politicians also change
their substantive positions.
Second, one would expect significant variation across
topic salience for the two strategies. Salient topics (e.g.,
migration) tend to polarize the electorate. Here, substan-
tive repositioning may come across as opportunistic and
create reputational costs. Politicians may thus be better off
putting such topics on their agenda, rather than chang-
ing their positions. Doing so allows officials to signal that
they take core issues seriously without coming across as a
flip-flopper. The case is arguably different for nonsalient
topics (e.g., culture). Here, agenda setting carries little
weight, particularly along the intensive margin. But sub-
stantive repositioning may well win over voters without
putting politicians’ reputation at risk.
To assess these theoretical considerations, we ex-
plore treatment effect heterogeneity by topic salience
FIGURE 5 Correlation between Cosine
Similarity and Substantive
Agreement
Note: The figure shows the joint distribution for cosine similarity
and substantive agreement, including the line of best fit (OLS).
To ease visual interpretation, observations are jittered.
14 ANSELM HAGER AND HANNO HILBIG
TABLE 7 Effects on Cosine Similarity and Substantive Agreement (Heterogeneity by Topic Salience)
Salient Topics Nonsalient Topics
Agenda Setting Substantive Agreement Agenda Setting Substantive Agreement
Exposure 0.0145∗ 0.1345 0.0126 0.1944∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.1244) (0.0087) (0.0608)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,729 85 2,955 127
Mean of DV 0.1261 0.1199 0.1223 0.0744
SD of DV 0.0973 0.3829 0.0998 0.2797
Effect size in SD 0.1489 0.3513 0.1259 0.6952
Note: The specification follows Table 2 and Table 6, respectively; the sample is split into salient and non-salient topics.
for the two measures (the salience measure is discussed
in SI Appendix 3). Table 7 supports our theoretical
expectations. For salient topics, we see no substantive
repositioning, but increases in agenda setting (cosine
similarity). By contrast, among nonsalient topics, elites
change their substantive positions but do not engage in
noticeable agenda setting. While the differences between
these estimates are noisy, they do buttress our intuition
that the measures for agenda setting and substantive
agreement are distinct and differ in theoretically plau-
sible ways.
Third, if public opinion research leads politicians to
adjust their agendas because of a “cognitive salience”
mechanism (as hypothesized above), treatment effects
should arguably increase when elites are repeatedly ex-
posed to the same topic. To explore this conjecture,
we proxy for repeated treatments by calculating the
dissemination time gap between two reports on the same
topic. The median time between reports is 33 days. In Ta-
ble 8, we reestimate the benchmark RD regression, split-
ting the sample along the median. The results show that
the exposure effect is more pronounced when another
report on the same issue was released relatively recently.
However, the effect is only detectable for parliamentary
speeches. The finding thus provides tentative evidence
that agenda setting is, indeed, more likely when politi-
cians are exposed to multiple reports within a relatively
short time frame.
Last, when politicians engage in agenda setting, one
would arguably not expect stronger treatment effects
when reports contain particularly novel information. Af-
ter all, we hypothesized that the public opinion research
reports lead to agenda setting by (a) communicating that
the topic is relevant to the electorate and (b) making
the topic cognitively salient to the politician. The novelty
of the report does not factor into the equation. To proxy
the degree to which reports contain new information, we
calculate the cosine similarity between a report and the
most recent previous report on the same topic. If a re-
port is relatively dissimilar compared to the last report, it
likely contains a greater amount of new information. We
then reestimate the benchmark model separately for two
subsets, defined by whether the prior report distance mea-
sure is above or below the sample median. Reassuringly,
TABLE 8 Effects on Cosine Similarity (Heterogeneity by Treatment Intensity)
Government Releases Parliamentary Speeches
Repeat Treat Nonrepeat Treat Repeat Treat NonRepeat Treat
Exposure 0.0114 0.0123 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0233
(0.0077) (0.0102) (0.0171) (0.0235)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,826 2,910 1,281 1,261
Mean of DV 0.1153 0.1303 0.0866 0.0923
SD of DV 0.0920 0.1002 0.0966 0.1081
Effect size in SD 0.1243 0.1225 0.5672 0.2156
Note: The specification follows Table 2 and Table 4, respectively; the sample is split into repeat and nonrepeat treatments, where the former
comprises all cases in which two reports on the same topic were published within 33 days (median split), and vice versa.
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TABLE 9 Effects on Cosine Similarity (Heterogeneity by Novelty of Report)
Government Releases Parliamentary Speeches
Not Novel Novel Not novel Novel
Exposure 0.0118 0.0093 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0435∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0084) (0.0239) (0.0198)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,808 2,208 1,030 1,512
Mean of DV 0.1455 0.1044 0.1027 0.0785
SD of DV 0.1025 0.0873 0.1036 0.1007
Effect size in SD 0.1149 0.1065 0.6060 0.4317
Note: The specification follows Table 2 and Table 4, respectively; the sample is split into novel and non-novel reports based on the cosine
similarity to the most recent previous report.
Table 9 shows no evidence that report novelty mediates
the magnitude of the treatment effect. Put differently,
the estimates across the “novel” and “not novel” sub-
sets are not different. We must caution, however, that this
analysis is not conclusive evidence that politicians entirely
disregard the novelty of the public opinion reports when
setting their agendas.
Generalizability
Can we characterize whether the findings generalize to
other contexts? The German electoral system is unique
in that it elects MPs both on the basis of plurality vote
within electoral districts (majoritarian) as well as on the
basis of party lists (proportional representation). Do we
observe different treatment effects in the parliamentary
speeches for MPs elected via party lists as opposed to
MPs elected by majority vote? To answer this question,
we coded whether MPs were directly elected or not using
the aforementioned sample of MPs (see SI Appendix 8).
TABLE 10 Effects on Cosine Similarity
(Heterogeneity by Electoral System)
Cosine Similarity
Elected in
District
Elected through
Party List
Exposure 0.0291 0.0401∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0177)
Covariates Yes Yes
Observations 1,437 1,950
Note: The specification follows Table 4; the sample is split according
to whether the speaker was elected directly in his or her district or
through the state party list.
We then repeat the analysis shown in Table 4, splitting
the sample into directly elected MPs and MPs who en-
tered parliament via their party’s list. Table 10 shows that
agenda setting is more pronounced among party list can-
didates. The finding is compatible with our theoretical
argument insofar as the opinion reports contain infor-
mation on the national median voter, which is arguably
more relevant to list candidates. Plurality candidates, by
contrast, face constituents whose opinion may differ sub-
stantially from the median voter. Therefore, district can-
didates may be less inclined to incorporate public opinion
into their speeches. If taken at face value, the evidence may
thus imply that agenda setting is most likely to arise in
PR systems.
Still, the fact that governments around the world en-
gage in sophisticated public opinion research makes it
unlikely that the German case is an outlier (Shapiro and
Jacobs 2001). What is more, the observed treatment ef-
fects permeate throughout the German political system
across different parties. Angela Merkel’s government is
also by no means exceptional in its use of public opin-
ion research. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for instance, was
advised by the Allensbach Institute, whereas Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder had close connections with the Forsa
Institute and its then CEO Manfred Güllner. This makes
it less likely that the findings are the product of a highly
specific case.
Discussion
This article has provided novel text-analytic evidence to
assess whether public opinion affects political speech.
Drawing on evidence from Germany, we found that
politicians change their speech markedly when exposed
to public opinion research. Not only does their speech
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become more similar to the language used in the pub-
lic opinion reports—a finding that points toward agenda
setting—but they also adjust their substantive positions
to the public’s preferences expressed in the reports. The
evidence thus brings clarity to one mechanism through
which politicians connect with voters: speech.
Before reflecting on the substantive implications of
the findings, two words of caution are in order. First,
this article assessed agenda setting using cosine similar-
ity, whereas substantive responsiveness was assessed using
human coding. The latter measure, given that it was coded
by humans, is less controversial. Still, reducing nuanced
public opinion reports and speeches—both of which sel-
dom touch on just one topic—to a one-dimensional
agreement-scale is not without problems. Politicians may,
for example, agree with some points made in an opinion
report, while disagreeing with others, which likely creates
measurement error. Regarding the former a critic might
object that cosine similarity does not reflect a true change
in agenda, but merely small rhetorical adjustments. We
have tried to address this concern by showing that (i)
similarity increases are driven by substantively meaning-
ful words and (ii) speechwriters do not plagiarize from
the reports. Still, we must again caution that we merely
detect agenda setting along the intensive margin—a result
of the local RD design.
Second, our attempt to make a causal argument de-
serves critical scrutiny. The consistent finding that cosine
similarity and substantive agreement increase right after
reports are given to cabinet members makes a causal in-
terpretation intuitive. Yet, a skeptic might say that the
observed changes are the product of a general shift in
rhetoric. Although we do not believe that a few days
should bring about such changes (indeed, the placebo
and permutation tests paint a different picture), the crit-
icism showcases the need to look at rhetoric in a more
dynamic setting. Future research could help model such
changes with greater clarity, perhaps by benchmarking
political speech to speech in the media. Relatedly, a skep-
tic might also quibble that the finding is tautological (i.e.,
politicians writing the survey questions and timing the
dissemination of the research). We believe that the qual-
itative and quantitative evidence rule out this possibility.
The pronounced coefficients do underline that elected
officials react to public opinion research. At a minimum,
our study thus provides descriptive evidence that cabinet
members systematically conduct public opinion research
and subsequently change their speech.
Having discussed these caveats, we want to briefly
reflect on how our research may be expanded. If German
politicians, indeed, adjust their speeches to public
opinion, this bears important insights for the study
of representative democracy. In times of increasing
polarization, a potential follow-up question is whether
citizens perceive such adjustments as deceptive or
manipulative. The beginning of the 2000s saw U.S.
pundits lament that American politicians were more
interested in responding to public opinion than in
crafting their own agenda. Such “finger-in-the-wind”
responsiveness was portrayed as a symbol for elected
officials’ lack of courage (Medvic and Dulio 2004). In
the German context, Angela Merkel has been described
in The New Yorker as “the quiet German”—a politician
who silently panders to public opinion (Packer 2014).
Similarly, leaked cables show that U.S. diplomats labeled
the chancellor “Teflon-Merkel.” Merkel’s rhetoric, so the
story goes, allows her to sidestep political controversy
(Waterfield 2010). Sophisticated public opinion data are
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, relying too
heavily on public opinion research can turn political
speech into a science that sidesteps truthful dialogue.
On the other hand, knowledge about public preferences
spurs responsiveness. These considerations showcase the
need to further explore the relationship between elite
speech and public opinion, mapping more fully the ways
in which government officials use and interpret public
preferences.
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Vaughn, Justin S., and José D. Villalobos. 2006. “Concep-
tualizing and Measuring White House Staff Influence on
Presidential Rhetoric.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36(4):
681–88.
Waterfield, Bruno. 2010. “WikiLeaks: Angela Merkel Only
Leader Man Enough to ‘Rule’ Europe.” http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/8168873/Wiki
Leaks-Angela-Merkel-only-leader-man-enough-to-rule-
Europe.html.
Weaver, David. 1991. “Issue Salience and Public Opinion: Are
There Consequences of Agenda-Setting?” International Jour-
nal of Public Opinion Research 3(1): 53–68.
Wlezien, Christopher. 2004. “Patterns of representation: Dy-
namics of Public Preferences and Policy.” Journal of Politics
66(1): 1–24.
Wood, Dan B. 2009. The Myth of Presidential Representation.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wood, B. Dan, and Han Soo Lee. 2009. “Explaining the Pres-
ident’s Issue Based Liberalism: Pandering, Partisanship, or
Pragmatism.” Journal of Politics 71(4): 1577–92.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online
in the Supporting Information section at the end of the
article.
Appendix 1: Topic categorization
Appendix 2: Classification of untagged speech documents
Appendix 3: Topic salience
Appendix 4: Substantive agreement
Appendix 5: Verbatim quotations
Appendix 6: Word contribution
Appendix 7: Jaccard similarity
Appendix 8: Parliamentary speech data
Appendix 9: Validating government public opinion re-
search
